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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Nous caractérisons une entreprise comme un ensemble d'activités et de projets avec leurs flux 
financiers  par  état  et  période.  Nous  proposons  une  caractérisation  de  l'entreprise  où  les 
variations dans le prix de marché du risque induisent des ajustements dans la combinaison 
optimale d’activit￩s ou de projets. Les modifications du portefeuille de projets génèrent des 
coûts de coordination. Nous proposons un nouveau rôle pour la gestion financière des risques 
en proposant que l'utilisation de titres financiers puisse réduire les coûts de coordination. Ce 
nouveau rôle de la gestion financière des risques est vérifié empiriquement, une fois pris en 
compte les facteurs explicatifs traditionnels de la gestion financière des risques. 
 
Mots clés : Gestion des risques, valeur d’entreprise, probl￨mes de coordination, 
hedging, valeur à risque. 
 
We characterize a firm as a nexus of activities and projects with their associated cash flow 
distributions across states of the world and time periods. We propose a characterization of 
the  firm  where  variations  in  the  market  price  of  risk  induce  adjustments  in  the  value-
maximizing  combination  of  projects.  Changing  the  portfolio  of  projects  generates 
coordination costs. We propose a new role for financial risk management based on the idea 
that the use of financial derivatives may reduce coordination costs. We find empirical support 
for this new rationale for the use of financial derivatives, after controlling for the traditional 
variables explaining the need for financial risk management. 
 
Keywords: Risk Management, firm value, coordination problems, hedging, 
value at risk. 
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The most recent theories for explaining the corporate use of ﬁnancial derivatives are decades old.
The convexity of the tax schedule was introduced by Main (1983), the reduction of bankruptcy
and ﬁnancial distress costs was mentioned in Booth et al (1984), the assessment of managerial
quality was ﬁr s tp r o p o s e db yD e M a r z oa n dD u ﬃe (1995) and Breeden and Vishwanathan (1996),
managerial risk aversion dates at least to Stulz (1984), and, ﬁnally, capital expenditure and
investment planning was presented in Mayers and Smith (1987).1 Since then no new theory,
that has survived empirical testing, has been developed to explain the need for ﬁnancial risk
management.
In this paper we propose a characterization of the ﬁrm where variations in the market price
of risk induce adjustments in the value-maximizing combination of projects undertaken by the
ﬁrm. However, changing the portfolio of projects is costly since it means that the ﬁrm’s specialists
(plant or division managers for instance as in Hart and Moore, 2005) must agree and coordinate
their eﬀorts to alter the mix. We argue that ﬁnancial derivative instruments can help lower
coordination costs between the ﬁrm’s specialists. The new viewpoint we develop is that ﬁnancial
risk management can alleviate coordination problems in complex modern ﬁrms.
We derive the prediction that the use of ﬁnancial instruments will be more pronounced when
the transformation possibility frontier (between the riskiness and expected value of project cash
ﬂows) is such that a small movement in the market price of risk will lead to important adjustments
in the ﬁrm’s portfolio of projects, a concept that we call reactivity. To test our model, we collected
information for 269 large U.S. ﬁrms for the years 1993 to 2004. We ﬁrst show that there is a strong
relationship at the industry level between the level of reactivity and the use of ﬁnancial derivative
instruments. We then show using ﬁrm level data that reactivity has a signiﬁcant positive impact
on the number of risks that a ﬁrm manages using ﬁnancial derivatives, even after controlling for
other variables traditionally expected to have a signiﬁcant impact on the use of ﬁnancial derivative
instruments. Our results are indeed consistent with Stulz (1996) stating “Perhaps more puzzling,
however, is that many companies appear to be using [ﬁnancial] risk management to pursue goals
other than variance reduction” and Guay and Kothari (2003) suggesting that ﬁrms may be “using
derivatives for purposes other than those predicted by traditional risk-management theory.”
1Stulz (2004) provides a systematic review of the various theoretical justiﬁcations for risk management within a
ﬁrm (see also Smithson and Simkins, 2005). For the convexity of the tax schedule, see also Smith and Stulz (1985),
Graham and Smith (1999), Graham and Rogers (2002) and Graham (2003), as well as MacKay and Moeller (2003)
and Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2008) for the case of general cost convexity. For the lower expected cost of
bankruptcy or ﬁnancial distress, see also Smith and Stulz (1985), Block and Gallagher (1986), Mayers and Smith
(1990), Nance et al. (1993), Geczy et al. (1997), and Bodnar et al. (1998). For managerial risk aversion, see also
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Tufano (1996). For improving the investment decisions and for better planning of a
ﬁrm’s capital needs, Bessembinder (1991), Lessard (1991), Doherty and Smith (1993), Froot et al. (1993), and
Holmström and Tirole (2000).
2We consider the ﬁrm as a nexus of projects and activities that give rise to a distribution
function of cash ﬂows across states of nature and time. In the spirit of a mean-variance world
used in basic portfolio management theory, we derive an eﬃcient frontier representing the ﬁrm’s
set of feasible projects and activities in a space with the expected value and riskiness of cash
ﬂows as coordinates. In this context, we adopt the view that production and operations managers
aim mainly at raising the expected value of cash ﬂows whereas real risk managers have as a
main objective to reduce the riskiness of cash ﬂows, thereby impacting the selection of projects
and activities that give rise to the distribution of cash ﬂows. This simpliﬁed structure captures,
albeit in a much stylized way, characteristics of complex modern corporations: the distribution,
communication and processing of information as in Bolton and Dewatripont (1984), the pervasive
presence of specialists as in Hart and Moore (2005), the limited control of business units managers
as in Dessein et al. (2005), and the decentralized functional authority framework as in Roberts
(2004).2
Given market conditions, all feasible combinations of projects and activities can be valued to
identify the combination that maximizes ﬁrm value. As a result, ﬁrm value is determined by the
portfolio of projects and activities and the market price of risk. As the market price of risk changes,
a ﬁrm must adjust its portfolio of projects, thereby changing its aggregate distribution of cash
ﬂows, to achieve a new optimal position on its transformation possibility frontier. Depending on
the shape of this frontier, the adjustments will be more or less pronounced. Movement towards
the new optimal combination of projects may lead to disagreements between specialized func-
tional managers or business units, given their respective speciﬁc objectives. We argue that such
disagreements underwrite the use of ﬁnancial instruments as a conﬂict resolution tool, thereby
giving the ﬁnancial risk manager a role as facilitator, if not coordinator, within the ﬁrm. Indeed,
using ﬁnancial instruments may provide important savings in view of the potentially high costs of
aligning incentives among managers and business units or engaging in expensive reorganizations3.
As usual, we ﬁnd in our context that, in the absence of such coordination frictions, there is no
role for ﬁnancial risk management since investors could undo any ﬁnancial transaction by a ﬁrm
so that ﬁrm value is then independent of the ﬁnancial risk management strategy (Titman 2002).4
2The trade-oﬀ between specialization beneﬁts and coordination costs and the impact of such trade-oﬀ on or-
ganizational structure have been noted by many authors. See also Becker and Murphy (1993), Boyer and Robert
(2006), Roberts (2004).
3Following discussions with senior corporate executives, we were comforted in the idea that coordination problems
associated with major strategic activities, decisions and investments were tackled by high-level committees involving
senior executives from diﬀerent business units, ﬁrm-wide management functions and board representatives. A
consensus must be reached before the reviewed investments, actions and changes in activities can be pursued and
implemented (See Roberts 2004). Similar issues are also highlighted in The Renewed Finance Function - Extending
Performance Management Beyond Finance, CFO Research Services, CFO Publishing Corporation, November 2007.
4Smith and Stulz (1985) and Jin and Jorion (2006) discuss a hedging irrelevance proposition similar to the
leverage irrelevance theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958): A ﬁrm cannot create value by hedging risks since
investors bear the same cost of risk as the ﬁrm. This characteristic is present in our context as well.
3The transformation possibility frontier includes implicitly both technological and strategic
characteristics of a ﬁrm. Our representation therefore captures the ability of a ﬁrm to change
its risk characteristics through changes in its portfolio of projects. These changes may increase
the value of the ﬁrm by decreasing its cash-ﬂow beta (Stulz 2004) or by increasing it if doing
so allows suﬃciently higher expected cash ﬂo w s .I nt h es a m es p i r i t ,w er e l a t eaﬁrm’s reactivity
with respect to the market price of risk to its use of ﬁnancial derivative products. Hence, in a
w o r l dw i t hn ot a x e s ,n ob a n k r u p t c yo rﬁnancial distress costs, and no agency conﬂicts between the
diﬀerent classes of stakeholders, there still exists a value-adding role for ﬁnancial risk management
as a relatively inexpensive tool to facilitate coordination and congruence of interests in the ﬁrm.
The simple theoretical and empirical ﬁndings we present support the idea that ﬁnancial risk
management alleviates coordination problems between diﬀerent ﬁrm functions and divisions when
changes in the ﬁrm’s portfolio of projects become necessary. Our new rationale for corporate risk
management theory, and the simple empirical test that we conduct, opens up a new area of
research for further developing and testing the idea that the complexity of the modern ﬁrm may
enhance the role of ﬁnancial derivatives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model of the eﬃcient
frontier and the value of a ﬁrm in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the reactivity of ﬁrms to changes
in the market price of risk and captures the coordination problems that may emerge between risk
managers and operations managers. It stresses the important role that ﬁnancial risk manage-
ment can play in alleviating these coordination problems. In Section 4, we conduct an empirical
study to investigate the link between the use of ﬁnancial instruments and the concavity of the
transformation possibility frontier. Section 5 extends the basic risk model and discusses several
issues from an industrial organization perspective. In addition, we illustrate how ﬁnancial risk
m a n a g e m e n tc a nh e l pi na l l e v i a t i n gt h ei m p a c to nﬁrm value of regulatory constraints such as
Va R . We conclude in Section 6.
2T h e ﬁrm as a portfolio of projects
2.1 Preliminaries
A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a nexus of projects representing all real activities, such as those related
to investment and production, and giving rise to a transformation possibility frontier for cash
ﬂows. This frontier is the envelope of all feasible vectors of cash ﬂo w so v e rs t a t e so fn a t u r ea n d
time periods obtainable from all projects characterizing and identifying the ﬁrm as an economic
entity. Hence, it accounts for all human, technological, contractual, legal and other constraints
facing a ﬁrm. In the short term, a ﬁrm can modify its overall distribution of cash ﬂows over
states and time periods and switch from one distribution to another within its feasibility set by
4changing its portfolio of projects. In the long term, a ﬁr mc a nm o d i f yi t sf e a s i b i l i t yf r o n t i e rb y
changing constraints underlying the transformation possibility set, generally through technological
and organizational innovations such as mergers, acquisitions and divestitures, or innovation and
patent initiation.
If a ﬁrm can change its operations or increase its ﬂexibility to signiﬁcantly reduce its risk
without changing expected cash ﬂows, its market value will increase as the given expected cash
ﬂows will be discounted at a lower rate. Rather than characterizing a ﬁrm by its market beta,
we see a ﬁrm as choosing, within its feasibility set, a portfolio of projects to obtain a distribution
of cash ﬂows that maximizes its value given the market price of risk. We therefore approach
risk management from the general viewpoint of the economics of the ﬁrm rather than from the
usual ﬁnancial perspective, in the spirit of the early contributions of Fama and Miller (1972) and
Cummins (1976).
To set ideas, we characterize in Figure 1 a ﬁrm by two blocks, real asset management and ﬁnan-
cial risk management. The ﬁrst block is broken down into production and operations management
(POM) on one hand, and real risk management (RRM) on the other. All activities within a ﬁrm,
such as project selection, self-protection and self-insurance activities, can be described along these
two dimensions. Financial risk management is purposely set apart and involves all transactions
carried out through the purchase or sale of ﬁnancial instruments.
[Insert Figure 1]
We ﬁrst show how to construct the eﬃcient frontier for a ﬁrm. This will involve the choice of a
risk model to characterize the trade-oﬀs between expected cash ﬂows and risk. For simplicity, we
start with a linear factor model, valid period by period, where all sources of risk are priced. We
then establish how to calculate the value of a ﬁrm. It will involve deriving an optimal portfolio
of projects given the market prices of risk factors.
2.2 The possibility frontier and the market prices of risk factors
A ﬁrm is a technology by which cash ﬂows cf
p
st related to various projects p ∈ {1,2,...,P} deﬁning
a ﬁrm as an economic entity are distributed over or transformed between diﬀerent states s and
periods t,w i t hs ∈ {1,2,...,S} and t ∈ {1,2,...,T}, under technological, legal, or contractual
constraints. The transformation possibility frontier of ﬁrm j (i.e., the envelope of all feasible
cash-ﬂow vectors) given its information set Ω0 at time t =0can be represented as
Gj (cf11,...,cf st,...,cf ST | Ω0)=0 , (1)
5where cfst is the aggregate cash ﬂow over all projects p in state s and period t. The envelope of
all feasible cash-ﬂow vectors is assumed to be concave.
A ﬁrm modiﬁes cash ﬂows through changes in its portfolio of projects. Characteristics of
the vector of aggregate cash ﬂows lead to the ﬁrm’s evaluation by ﬁnancial markets. Given its
technological possibilities represented by (1), a ﬁrm chooses the mix of POM and RRM activities
to reach the vector of aggregate cash ﬂows that maximizes its value. Hence, the frontier Gj (·)=0
must be understood as the frontier that emerges from the POM and RRM activities. We later
discuss the representation of ﬁnancial risk management activities in this framework.
For presentation clarity, we now describe a multifactor model with N orthogonal risk factors
so that their mutual covariances are zero. We also assume, for simplicity, constant expected cash
ﬂows per period, Es(cfst)=Ej, ∀t, a n da ni n ﬁn i t en u m b e ro fp e r i o d s .T h er a t ea tw h i c ht h e s e
constant expected cash ﬂows should be discounted is given by:
ERj = RF +
N X
i=1
βji(ERi − RF) (2)
where ERi is the expected return on risk factor i, RF is the risk free rate, and βji is the measure





Expressed in terms of cash ﬂows, the security market hyperplane (2) takes the form:
Ej = VjERj = VjRF +
N X
i=1
Vjβji(ERi − RF), (4)


















where ρji is the correlation between the ﬁrm j cash ﬂows and the returns on the ith risk factor,
σcfj measures the volatility of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and σi measures the volatility of the return
on the i-th risk factor. We can rewrite (4) as























Given market values of RF, ERi and σi,t h ev a l u eo faﬁrm depends, in this context, only on Ej
and the N scaled correlations SCORji = ρjiσcfj between a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and market returns
on the diﬀerent risk factors.
Relative to valuing a ﬁrm, the variables Ej and SCORji ≡ ρjiσcfj,i∈ {1,2,...,N} are N +1
suﬃcient statistics of all projects within a ﬁrm. The transformation possibility frontier (1) can
therefore be rewritten in terms of Ej and SCORji as the envelope of all feasible points:
Hj (Ej,SCOR j1,...,SCOR jN)=0 . (8)
We will work with this representation of a ﬁrm’s technology.5
Deﬁning a ﬁrm’s feasibility set in terms of expected cash ﬂows Ej and the N scaled correlation
values SCORji has several advantages. First, it allows the value of RRM and POM activities
to be measured by their capacity to move a ﬁrm toward or along the frontier Hj(·)=0in the
(Ej,SCOR j1,...,SCOR jN)-space. A change in the mix of POM and RRM activities will usually
generate a change of value. Second, it allows proper aggregation of risks at the ﬁrm level by
establishing a functional relationship between risk factors and cash ﬂows for the many projects or
business units. Identifying risk factors that are common to the various projects and accounting for
the dependencies between them is an important function, which can fall under the responsibility
of a central unit or delegated to various units. The identiﬁcation and measurement tasks are
important functions of the chief operating oﬃcer, the chief risk oﬃcer and the chief executive
oﬃcer.
2.3 The value of the ﬁrm
The value of a ﬁrm is generated by a mix of POM and RRM activities. For simplicity, one may
represent POM (resp. RRM) as being intent on maximizing expected cash ﬂows (resp. minimizing
scaled correlations) for given scaled correlations of a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows (resp. expected cash ﬂows)
with the N diﬀerent risk factor returns. Both activities thus contribute to the overall objective of
maximizing value. In reality, these functions are often diﬀuse in an organization and sometimes
shared by the same division. In this context, the primary responsibility of higher level executives
is to ensure that a ﬁrm’s decision making process brings it on its frontier.
5To draw the eﬃcient frontier for a given ﬁrm, one needs the set of cash ﬂows associated with the numerous
projects deﬁning the ﬁrm as a business entity along with the scaled correlations between the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows and
the returns on risk factors. Although the collection of such data is no small task, ﬁrms do undertake it, at least at
some level of aggregation.
7For further simplicity, let us assume that there is a single risk factor, namely the market
portfolio risk. This will allow us to develop the main ideas in a simple graphical fashion. With
SCORjM = ρjMσcfj, we can write (6) and (7) as:6
















From (9), we observe that β ≤ [≥]1as SCORM ≤ [≥] Vσ M. We can illustrate the problem of
a ﬁrm in the (E,SCORM)-space as in Figure 2, where each dot represents a potential project or
portfolio of projects with a (E,SCORM) pair of coordinates. All projects a ﬁrm can undertake are
represented in that space where the frontier is constructed as the minimum level of risk obtainable
for a given level of expected cash ﬂows (see Merton, 1972).
[Insert Figure 2]
We can represent iso-value lines as in Figure 3. By deﬁnition, an iso-value line represents
combinations of E and SCORM giving the same market value. From (10), iso-value lines are
linear and parallel, with slope equal to the market price of risk
θM =




The value V attached to a given iso-value line can be obtained by discounting the zero-SCOR
expected cash-ﬂow level (C1 and C2 in Figure 3) at the risk-free rate RF: V1 = C1/RF, V2 =
C2/RF. Firm value increases in the North-West direction.
The combination of expected cash ﬂows (E) and scaled correlation between cash ﬂows and
market returns (SCORM)t h a tm a x i m i z e sﬁrm value is the combination at which the eﬃcient
frontier reaches the highest iso-value line. For that combination (point A2 on Figure 3), the usual
tangency condition holds:
Proposition To maximize its value, a ﬁrm must equate its marginal rate of substi-
tution, the rate at which it can substitute POM and RRM activities while remaining











E (RM) − RF
σM
. (12)
6We will drop the index of ﬁrm j when the context is clear and no confusion is possible.
8At A2 on Figure 3, a ﬁrm cannot reduce its scaled correlation without reducing expected cash
ﬂows. At point A1, however, the scaled correlation can be reduced without aﬀecting expected cash
ﬂows because point A1 is not located on the eﬃcient frontier. A ﬁr m ’ sP O Ma n dR R Ms t r a t e g i e s
and policies are not eﬃcient if they bring it to a situation such as point A1. By better managing
its real risk to reduce the scaled correlation of its cash ﬂows, or by better managing operations
to increase expected cash ﬂows, a ﬁrm is able to increase its value. In this framework, the ﬁrm
is assumed to maximize its value. Given that ﬁnancial markets care about expected returns and
risk, so does the ﬁrm. In so doing, the ﬁrm is not risk averse but rather sensitive to the way
markets evaluate cash-ﬂow distribution over states of nature and periods.
It is obvious that a N-factor linear model will be an immediate extension to the single risk
factor model we just described. A ﬁrm will maximize its value at the point of tangency between
an eﬃcient hyper-frontier and the highest reachable iso-value hyperplane. In Section 5, we also
discuss how to account for unpriced risk factors and sketch a general intertemporal risk model.
For the purpose of illustrating the role of ﬁnancial risk management and motivating our empirical
application relating the eﬃcient frontier to hedging activities, we will maintain a simple one-factor
risk model.
3 Firm Value and Financial Instruments
Developments in the previous sections dealt mainly with real asset management. This section
covers the role of ﬁnancial risk management. Our main argument will be that ﬁnancial risk
management is a relatively inexpensive way to facilitate coordination in responding to changes
in market conditions. Changes in the price of risk alter the portfolio of projects and activities
that maximizes ﬁrm value; this creates coordination problems that the ﬁnancial risk manager can
alleviate. Although the necessary changes in the portfolio of projects are the same with or without
t h ep r e s e n c eo faﬁnancial risk manager, his presence allows the ﬁrm to achieve these changes at
a lower coordination cost. When the market price of risk changes, the extent by which a ﬁrm’s
portfolio of projects must change depends on the distance between the old and the new portfolio
of projects. If the eﬃcient frontier is relatively ﬂat, the change in the optimal portfolio involves
a rather important reshuﬄing of projects. On the opposite, a less important change is needed if
the frontier is more concave. The precise measure of the reactivity of the ﬁrm to changes in the
market price of risk will be discussed in the next section.
Whereas the transaction costs associated with ﬁnancial instruments are low, coordinating
changes in real operations through the implementation of new projects or the abandonment of
existing ones typically entails substantial coordination costs. Moving from one optimal portfolio
of projects to another involves a complex set of trade-oﬀs in terms of increasing or reducing cash
9ﬂows and increasing or reducing risk among the many organizational units of a ﬁrm, each mixing
production and operations management activities and real risk management activities. Several
cash ﬂows-at-risk or value-at-risk constraints may also be imposed at various levels in an organi-
zation. We argue through a simple graphical illustration that ﬁnancial risk management reduces
the coordination cost of implementing the desired changes in real operations. As a result, ﬁrms
that are more reactive to changes in the price of risk are more likely to use ﬁnancial derivatives
to make real adjustments less costly.
To understand and model these complex interrelationships, one needs to rely on the gen-
eral theory of decentralization in hierarchies and on the theory of incentives under incomplete
information. As evident in Mookherjee (2006), the theory of incentives has ignored so far the
decentralization of risk management objectives. Moreover, aggregation of VaR targets in the risk
management literature raises diﬃculties even abstracting from incentive issues.
To develop our argument while avoiding an unnecessarily complex modeling of the structural
interactions in organizations, we assume a separation of objectives between real risk management,
intent on reducing the SCOR value (that is, favoring projects that contribute to that goal), and
production and operations management, intent on increasing the E value. Conﬂicts may therefore
appear: the real risk manager will tend to oppose changes that increase the riskiness of cash ﬂows
(SCOR) whereas the production and operations manager will tend to oppose changes that reduce
expected cash ﬂows (E).7 Such a representation of the conﬂict between RRM and POM functions
is admittedly extreme. It nevertheless characterizes in a simpliﬁed way the diﬃculties encoun-
tered when various managers need to coordinate their choices to maximize value. As mentioned
above, major investments and policy or strategy decisions must typically gather a relatively large
consensus among managers, executives and board members before being undertaken.8 We sketch
below the coordination problems between RRM and POM in this simpliﬁed setting.
3.1 Value creating coordination
Suppose, for some reason, that a ﬁrm ﬁnds itself at a point on its eﬃciency frontier to the left of
the optimal mix of POM and RRM activities as represented by point A1 in Figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4]
7In large corporations bonuses are usually linked to cash-ﬂow performance targets and less so to risk measures.
Even option-based compensation rewards managers for cash-ﬂow performance to the possible detriment of real
risk management activities. With respect to the compensation of real risk managers, Gable and Sinclair-Desgagné
(1997) and Sinclair-Desgagné (1999) oﬀer an audit-like procedure to assess managerial performance in the context
of environmental (real) risk management and control. An excellent cash-ﬂow performance of a manager may be
penalized if the audit procedure reveals that it has been achieved to the detriment of proper risk management.
8One can also think of coordination problems as being driven by organizational inertia, which emerges as diﬀerent
groups (or management functions) acquire quasi-veto rights on some changes in the activities of a ﬁrm. See Hannan
and Freeman (1984) and Boyer and Robert (2006).
10If the POM manager continues trying to increase E for a given SCOR, while the RRM manager
keeps working to reduce SCOR for a given E,t h eﬁrm as a whole ﬁnds itself trying to move
in an infeasible North-West direction. The way out of this eﬃcient but not value maximizing
combination of POM and RRM activities is for the RRM manager to let the SCOR increase
above its current level, providing the POM manager with some leeway to increase E.I ns od o i n g ,
the RRM manager must momentarily destroy value, by letting SCOR increase given E,g i v i n g
the POM manager the ﬂexibility to ultimately increase ﬁr mv a l u e . T h es a m ea r g u m e n tc a nb e
developed for point A2. In this case the POM manager must let E decrease below its current
level. In so doing, the POM manager must momentarily destroy value to give the RRM manager
the possibility to reduce SCOR, thereby create value. In both instances, it is necessary for one
manager to destroy ﬁrm value initially to allow the other manager enough room to eventually
create more value. This level of coordination is clearly diﬃcult as the former manager must
assume some career risk.
3.2 Firm reactivity and value creation through ﬁnancial risk management
We have thus far posited that in our framework with no taxes, no ﬁnancial distress costs, no
transaction costs of bankruptcy, and no agency problems, value is created within a ﬁrm only
through its choice of real projects and activities.9 This means that maximal value is created only
through an optimal mix of real activities, blending both POM and RRM ones. As the market price
of risk changes, the optimal E − SCOR combination of cash ﬂows also changes, thus generating
signiﬁcant coordination problems. We will now show that ﬁnancial risk management creates value
by alleviating these coordination problems.
Consider Figure 5. Suppose a ﬁrm’s optimal mix is initially at A2 but because of a change
in the market price of risk, the new optimal mix is at A0. Suppose, moreover, that the POM
manager is unwilling or unable to destroy positive net present value projects (moving down) to
provide the RRM manager with enough ﬂexibility to reach point A0.10 How can ﬁnancial risk
management help in this process?
[Insert Figure 5]
Consider the iso-value line that goes through point A2. This line is, by deﬁnition, lower than the
iso-value line tangent to the possibility frontier at point A0. The slope of iso-value lines is the
price of risk, that is, the price at which one can exchange risk, SCOR, for expected cash ﬂows E
9This statement is clearly reminiscent of Proposition III in Modigliani and Miller (1958, page 288): “... the
cut-oﬀ point for investment in the ﬁrm ...will be completely unaﬀected by the type of security used to ﬁnance the
investment.”
10Similarly, if we start at point A1, the RRM manager is unwilling to create risk and destroy value to give the
POM manager enough ﬂexibility to reach point A0.
11on ﬁnancial markets. Therefore, under conditions of perfect ﬁnancial markets a n di nam a n n e r
similar to an individual’s portfolio choice under the two-fund separation approach, a ﬁrm can
enter into ﬁnancial transactions to move from A2 to any point on the same iso-value line. These
movements, for example to point B, are done at no cost, by assumption, but do not aﬀect ﬁrm
value since ﬁnancial transactions are not creating value per se.
The advantage of moving a ﬁrm’s (E,SCOR) combination to point B is that the RRM and
POM managers are then given the mandate to move the ﬁrm from B to A0. What then is the
value of ﬁnancial risk management? In and of itself, the value is zero. Its value comes from the fact
that it reduces the coordination costs to attain a new mix of risk and expected cash ﬂows. Moving
from A2 to A0 requires abandoning [accepting] some projects with positive [negative] net present
value given the SCOR-coordinate at A2, hence the normal opposition of the POM manager to
those changes. Similarly, moving from A1 to A0 requires abandoning [accepting] some projects
that are risk reducing [increasing] given the E-coordinate at A1, hence the natural opposition of
the RRM manager to those changes. But given the new E and SCOR coordinates at B,t h e
real changes in the project mix to move the ﬁrm from B to A0 can now be agreed upon by both
managers: the real changes are the same but they can be achieved at lower coordination costs.
4 Empirical evidence on the link between ﬁrm reactivity and hedging
Assuming that a ﬁrm can gather all the necessary information about future cash ﬂows associated
with its numerous projects, current and future, and given a risk model, it can construct at any
time the type of eﬃciency frontier we have described in the previous sections. Obviously, this is
not an easy and straightforward task. We analyze some of the diﬃculties in section 5.2 below.
It is much harder to gather a panel of such data sets for several ﬁrms. Therefore, to test some
implications of our characterization of the ﬁrm, we will adopt an indirect approach.
The important empirical implication of our ﬁrm characterization is that more reactive ﬁrms,
having less concave possibility frontiers, will want to adjust their (SCOR,E) position by larger
margins when the market price of risk changes. Figure 7 illustrates our point.
[Insert Figure 7]
A ﬁrm whose possibility frontier is more concave will react less to changes in the market price of
risk (moving typically from point A to point Blow in Figure 7) and therefore will need little change
in its portfolio of projects and activities. On the other hand, a ﬁrm whose possibility frontier is
less concave will see its optimal project mix change more (typically from point A to point Bhigh).
Our empirical analysis will proceed in two steps. First, we propose a measure of ﬁrm reactivity
to risk price changes. Then, we want to link this reactivity to the use of ﬁnancial derivatives since
12more reactive ﬁrms should be heavier users of ﬁnancial risk management products to alleviate
coordination costs associated with large changes in their portfolio of projects.
4.1 Data Set Construction
We build our data set starting from the 500 ﬁrms making up the Standard and Poor’s 500
index. For all ﬁrms present in the index over the period 1993-2004, we gather annual accounting
information and stock market information from annual Reports, Compustat, Bloomberg and
CRSP, as well as derivative usage and managerial shareholding and option ownership from the
E D G A RU SD a t a b a s e .W ep r o v i d ei na na p p e n d i xal i s to fa l ld a t ai t e m sr e q u i r e df o ro u re m p i r i c a l
analysis with their source11. Not all data items were available for all ﬁrms over the sample period.
In the end, we were left with 269 companies.
The distribution of ﬁrms across industries is given in Table 1. The manufacturing sector
represents a large proportion of the total but this will not bear a signiﬁcant weight on the results
of our main analysis based on individual ﬁrms as long as there is enough cross-sectional variation
in the reactivity of manufacturing ﬁrms. We will see that it is indeed the case.
4.2 Measuring Reactivity and the Use of Financial Derivatives
To compute the reactivity factor, we ﬁrst measure the annual change ∆Pj in a ﬁrm j position in
the (SCOR,E)-space by the Euclidian distance between the ﬁrm positions in two adjacent years,
scaled by the ﬁrm market value Vj to control for size, that is:
∆Pjt ≡
q
(SCORjt − SCORj,t−1)2 +( CFjt − CFj,t−1)2/Vjt
where SCORjt = Vjt ∗ σMt ∗ βjt,w i t hσMt being the volatility of market returns at time t,
computed historically over the last two hundred trading days, and βjt being ﬁrm j’s market beta
in period t.
We then run a linear regression of the change in a ﬁrm’s position (∆Pjt) on the annual change
in the market price of risk (∆θt) over the period 1993-2004, that is:
∆Pjt = αj + γj∆θt + εjt (13)
where ∆θt = θt − θt−1,w i t hθt given by (11). The regression coeﬃcient γj is our measure of
reactivity for ﬁrm j. Notice that it is an average measure over the sampling period that deﬁnes
the structural characteristic of a ﬁrm.
11A longer appendix providing more details is available from the authors upon request.
13For the use of ﬁnancial derivatives, researchers have most often used a dichotomous variable
that takes the value 1 when the ﬁrm uses derivatives and 0 when it does not. This variable
would leave us with two little cross-sectional variation between ﬁrms to identify the link between
reactivity and use of derivatives. In our data set, we managed to collect use of derivatives for four
types of risks for each ﬁrm. In the EDGAR database, as deﬁned by US regulation, ﬁrms report
hedging for equity risk, commodity risk, exchange rate risk, and interest rate risk. The ﬁrst three
are considered operational and the last one ﬁnancial. Attributing a (0,1) variable for each type
of risk we can now count the number of risks a ﬁrm hedges. This is the variable we will use for
our analysis.
To study the link between the reactivity measure we have constructed and this measure for
the use of ﬁnancial derivatives we will proceed ﬁrst at an aggregate industry level. The idea
will be to determine whether the more reactive industries hedge more risks. Then we will run a
multivariate ordered probit with the number of risks as a dependent variable at the ﬁrm level to
establish whether reactivity enters as a signiﬁcant explanatory variable over and above the usual
variables used to explain the hedging behavior of ﬁrms.
We will conduct our analysis for the cross-section of ﬁrms in 2004, the end-point of our
sample. This will prevent to some extent endogeneity issues since the γi, the reactivity measures,
are computed over a ten-year period (1993-2004) and all the other variables will take the value in
the cross-section of 2004.
4.3 Estimation of the link between reactivity and hedging
Before assessing the link between reactivity and the use of ﬁnancial derivatives at the ﬁrm level
we want to see if our hypothesis gets some empirical support at the industry level. To perform the
analysis, we use the industry categories of Table 1. The non-classiﬁed refers in fact to conglom-
erates, which are known to be heavy users of ﬁnancial derivatives. We then add this reference
category to see how it ranks in terms of reactivity.
4.3.1 Industry level analysis
We compute a given industry’s reactivity by the Vi-weighted average of reactivity measures γj
(from regressions 13)o ft h eﬁrms in that industry. To compute the aggregate use of derivatives
by an industry, we use four 0-1 variables indicating whether in 2004 a ﬁrm hedges or not a given
risk, whose sum gives the number of risks hedged by a given ﬁrm. We then take the weighted
average of those numbers, where the weights are the ratios of the market values of the ﬁrms over
the total market value of the industry.
Table 2 presents the ranking of the twelve industries in terms of their estimated reactivity level
γ, from the most reactive (Utilities) to the least reactive (Construction). The other columns of the
14table show the market-value weighted average number of operational risks (equity, commodity, and
foreign exchange) that ﬁrms in that industry manage through the use of derivative contracts as
well as the average number of total risks (operational plus interest rate) managed. The six most
reactive industries (Utilities to Service) are those that are the top users of ﬁnancial derivative
contracts to manage operational risks. Although the ranking diﬀers slightly when we add the
use of interest risk derivatives, the same six most reactive industries remain the top six users of
derivative contracts.
Figure 8 illustrates graphically the link between average industry reactivity and the average
number of operational risks managed (a similar picture is obtained when the total number of risks
is used). The linear relationship is of positive slope, which is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level,
and no industry appears in the second and fourth quadrants.
[Insert Figure 8]
4.3.2 Firm level analysis
We now examine the relationship between the estimated reactivity level γj and the number of
operational risks managed at the ﬁrm level in 2004. The number of ﬁrms in the sample is reduced
to 238 as we dropped the 31 ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial industry since some variables (quick ratio,
foreign sales and reserves) are not computed in the same way as in other industries. Moreover,
ﬁnancial ﬁrms are both users and providers of ﬁnancial derivatives. Of the ﬁrms in the sample,
29.8% use no derivative instrument to manage operational risk, 50% manage only one risk through
derivatives, 18.5% two risks, and 1.7% manage all three risks.
We use a ranked probit approach.12 The dependent variable is the number of operational risks
that a ﬁrm manages using derivatives. Therefore, this variable takes the value 0, 1, 2 or 3. We
use the following explanatory variables. First and foremost we want to include the variables that
previous studies have chosen to explain the use of ﬁnancial derivatives by ﬁrms to hedge risk.
These include the quick ratio (current assets minus inventories divided by current liabilities), the
ratio of foreign sales to total sales, and the carry-forward of net operating losses over the total
assets: the higher the ﬁrst ratio is, the less need there is for a ﬁrm to hedge; a ﬁrm with signiﬁcant
foreign operations will be subject to currency risk and will therefore be more likely to use foreign
exchange derivatives; ﬁnally, the last variable measures the tax beneﬁt that can be obtained by
carrying forward losses. These three variables are the traditional measures included in hedging
studies for leverage, foreign exposure and convexity of the tax schedule.13 The fourth traditional
12De Angelis and Garcia (2008) show the advantage of such a ranked approach over a simple logit for the use of
derivatives or a Heckman-type two-step approach.
13See Graham and Rogers (2002), Allayannis and Weston (2001), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Graham and Smith
(1999).
15variable related to the use of ﬁnancial derivatives is the size of the ﬁrm14 and we measure it by
the logarithm of the ﬁrm assets.
A potential problem with using S&P500 ﬁrms is to overrepresent large ﬁrms in the sample.
Since large ﬁrms tend to use more ﬁnancial derivatives because of the large ﬁxed cost of using
derivatives, one may argue that we lack cross-sectional variation to support reactivity as a reason
for hedging due to implicit coordination costs. To address this issue, we control for size in our
ordered probit analysis.
Graham and Rogers (2002) argue against the net operating losses as a proxy for measuring
the tax beneﬁt and propose a reﬁned measure using the Graham and Smith (1999) approach to
explicitly measure tax function convexity. This technique quantiﬁes the convexity-based beneﬁts of
hedging by determining the tax savings that result from reducing volatility. Another explanatory
variable often used to explain the hedging decision is a ratio of long-term debt to the assets of a
ﬁrm.15 However, it is usually the interest rate risk that is considered when accounting for the tax
incentive to hedge by increasing debt capacity.16 We include this variable but considering that we
do not include the use of interest rate derivatives we do not expect this variable to be signiﬁcant.
Our purpose is to verify that our reactivity variable still plays a signiﬁcant role after controlling
for the tax beneﬁte ﬀect and that we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect for net operating losses as in the
previous studies using this proxy. This is indeed the case.
We estimate the probit model by maximum likelihood.17 T h er e s u l t sa r er e p o r t e di nT a b l e3 ,
where a coeﬃcient (together with a p-value) refers to the impact of that variable on the probability
that the ﬁrm hedges a greater number of operational risks. All four traditional variables above
come out with the expected sign and are signiﬁcant at close to the 5% level, especially after
controlling for the industry eﬀect. Therefore, our analysis conﬁrms the ﬁndings of previous studies.
More importantly for the purpose of this paper, however, the results in Table 3 show quite clearly
that reactivity has a statistically signiﬁcant positive impact on the number of operational risks
managed with ﬁnancial derivatives. This result, together with the previous ranking of industry
reactivity and use of derivatives, supports our hypothesis that a ﬁrm’s sensitivity to the market
price of risk is a strong determinant of the use of ﬁnancial derivatives, in addition to the traditional
reasons for hedging such as leverage, foreign exposure, convexity of the tax schedule, and size.
To capture the role of ﬁnancial risk management in alleviating coordination problems we also
introduce the number of business segments in a ﬁrm18. This is certainly an imperfect measure of
coordination problems or costs but it indicates that the hierarchical structure is important over
and above the mere size of the ﬁrm. Its clear signiﬁcance reinforces the link between hedging and
14See among others Nance et al. (1993).
15See among others Graham and Rogers (2002).
16Graham and Rogers (2002) also ﬁnd that hedging leads to greater debt capacity.
17A full description of the variables included in the probit is given in the appendix.
18See the appendix for a description of how this variable was constructed
16the complexity of the ﬁrm’s activities. We present also results with a control for the industry
to which a ﬁrm belongs. In this case we prefer not to include business segments.19 The results
remain robust and are practically the same as without the control for industry.
We have also included in the probit model other variables that some previous studies have used
to explain hedging such as dividend policy, the book-to-market ratio, and the security holdings
of the managers in the ﬁrm to account for risk aversion in agency frameworks20.N o n eo ft h o s ei s
signiﬁcant at reasonable levels of conﬁdence.
For robustness purposes, we ran a series of other regressions that for space considerations
we do not report. We started our investigation by running a simple logit, where we considered
only the use or no-use of derivatives as the dependent variable. The usual hedging variables
came out with the right sign and were signiﬁcant except for the net operating losses, while the
reactivity variable had the right sign but with a coeﬃcient twice as small and a p-value of 0.35.
Obviously accounting for the number of risks adds useful information to the regression to identify
the propensity of a ﬁrm to use derivatives with more or less intensity21.
We have also tried other measures of reactivity based on the curvature of the frontier instead
of the distance between the expected cash ﬂow - risk positions. The results were similar but less
signiﬁcant. Finally, we included the beta of the ﬁrms to control for the level of risk but it did not
come out signiﬁcant22.
5 Discussion
In this section we extend the analysis in diﬀerent directions. We ﬁrst discuss extensions of the
basic risk model, then we point to the problems of acquiring the proper information to draw
the eﬃcient frontier, and ﬁnally we mention some implications of our analysis from an industrial
organization perspective.
19The number of segments was collected in the annual reports of the ﬁrms. Given how Compustat classiﬁes a
company’s industry it would be econometrically unsound to include both the number of business segments and
industry control dummies in the same regression. For instance Compustat has one industry category called "non
classiﬁed" that clearly includes the large conglomerates purely on the basis of the number of business segments.
Also there are industries where the choice of business segments is more reﬁned than in other industries and the
number of business segments to report is determined by the ﬁrm (see Harris, 1998), which induces a systemic bias
in the number of business segments across industries.
20For the determination of managerial shareholding and option ownership, we analyzed the portfolio of the top
ﬁve executives of the ﬁrm as in Ofek and Yermack (2000).
21In a very thorough econometric analysis, DeAngelis and Garcia (2008) show the advantage of using a ranked
probit instead of a simple logit with an indicator variable for the use of derivatives.
22The cross-sectional correlation between the γj of the ﬁrms and the betas in 2004 was -0.25. We computed this
correlation with the betas for other years and always found a negative number of a similar magnitude. One can
argue that there should be a negative relation between the beta of a ﬁrm and its reactivity factor. A ﬁrm that can
change its activities easily after a variation in the price of market risk should be less risky.
175.1 Extensions of the basic risk model
To show that the approach is not limited to the simple risk model analyzed above, we brieﬂy
discuss two important extensions. First, we account for the fact that not all risks are priced by
the market. This will not prevent the ﬁrm from optimizing, as we will explain. Second, and more
importantly, we set the trade-oﬀs between expected cash ﬂows and risk in a dynamic framework
through a general stochastic discount factor. This formulation will be compatible with many risk
model speciﬁcations and encompass the linear multifactor model speciﬁed in the previous section.
5.1.1 The case of non-valued risks
We have assumed until now that all the risk factors have a market price, so that ﬁrm value
maximization is achieved at the optimal tangency point between the iso-value hyperplane and the
possibility frontier. When the market does not value some risks that are nevertheless taken into
consideration by a ﬁrm, the valuation problem is diﬀerent.
We can illustrate this situation with two risk factors: the ﬁr s ti sv a l u e db yt h em a r k e ta n d
i sr e p r e s e n t e db yt h em a r k e tp o r t f o l i ow h i l et h es e c o n di sm a n a g e db yt h eﬁrm at some cost
but is diversiﬁable for an outside investor so that its market value is zero. At what optimal
level should a ﬁrm manage this non-valued risk? Each level of non-valued risk corresponds to
a projected transformation possibility frontier in the space expected value — market-valued risk,
namely H(E,SCORM | SCORNV)=0 ,w h e r eSCORNV is the level of non-valued risk taken or
assumed by a ﬁrm. Under some reasonable assumptions about the non-valued risk (including the
existence of a unique global maximum), there is one best or maximal transformation possibility
frontier in the space expected value — market-valued risk, namely H(E,SCORM | SCOR∗
NV)=0 .
The tangency point between the highest iso-value line and this maximal frontier gives the maximal
market value of a ﬁrm.23
5.1.2 An Intertemporal Framework
In the simple risk model we speciﬁed earlier, we have sidestepped the problem of computing the
present value of intertemporal cash ﬂows by assuming a ﬂat term structure and a constant risk
measure over time. Therefore, the transformation possibility frontier did not change over time.
In a more realistic setting where risk and return change over time, we need to compute at each
point in time, say t,a ne ﬃcient frontier Ht(Et,SCOR t)=0 ,w h e r eEt and SCORt group all the
conditional expected values and scaled correlations. The extension to an intertemporal framework
23A parallel can be drawn with the production function using a non-valued or zero-cost input, such as water or
air. If production aﬀects the quality of this input, there will be an optimal amount of activity, say in terms of
quantity of pollutants rejected, that will be compatible with maximizing proﬁt. Similarly, there will an optimal
amount of non-valued risk that a ﬁrm should take or assume in order to maximize its market value in the (expected
value, market-valued risk)—space. In so doing, a ﬁrm optimally manages this non-valued risk.
18can be set in an Arrow-Debreu type economy or in a world with a general stochastic discount
factor. In such intertemporal extensions, the price of risk and the price of time will play a role in
the marginal trade-oﬀst h eﬁrm will engage in, both across states of nature and periods.
To be as general as possible, we need not specify a linear risk model. We can rely on the
existence of a stochastic discount factor, say mt,T, which gives the value in t of a cash ﬂow in
T, in the absence of arbitrage opportunities. The value in t of any project within a ﬁrm with
associated cash ﬂows Ct+1,···,C T from t +1to T is then given by:
Pt = Et[mt,t+1Ct+1 + ...+ mt,TCT] (14)
B yt h ec o v a r i a n c ef o r m u l a ,w ec a nr e w r i t et h i se xpression as the sum of two distinct blocks, one
for products of expectations, the other for covariances:
Pt = EVt + COVt (15)
with:
EVt = Et[mt,t+1]Et[Ct+1]+···+ Et[mt,T]Et[CT] (16)
COVt = Covt(mt,t+1Ct+1)+···+ Covt(mt,TCT)
The expectation terms Et[mt,τ]T
τ=t+1 provide the prices of zero-coupon bonds for corresponding
horizons τ = t +1 , ···,T. An eﬃciency frontier can then be deﬁn e di nt e r m so f(Et,COV t) as
before, but now the frontier will change at each period depending on the evolution of the term
structure of interest rates and of the risk measures embedded in the stochastic discount factors.
Since all quantities have been discounted at time t accounting for both the values of time and
risk in cash ﬂows over time and states of nature the iso-value lines will have a slope of one. Of
course the analysis of the trade-oﬀs between expected cash ﬂows and risk or between diﬀerent
risks becomes more involved but remains possible once a speciﬁc content is given to the stochastic
discount factor through a model.24
24When the stochastic discount factor corresponds to the CAPM or the linear multifactor model described in
section 2.2, the trade-oﬀs can be expressed between expected cash ﬂows and scaled correlations. To obtain a
similar separation of parameters leading to the use of scaled correlations with the general speciﬁcation in (14),
more structure is needed in the stochastic discount factor. For example, one can extend the factor model described
earlier to a dynamic factor model where the scaled correlations will change over time, assuming, for simplicity, that
the term structure of interest rates is ﬂat.
195.2 Caveats on information acquisition
In deriving the transformation possibility frontier between the expected value of projects and
their risk, we have assumed away technical or informational issues. Such issues could prevent a
chief executive oﬃcer from implementing the necessary trade-oﬀs. We will sketch below the main
obstacles such as incomplete and asymmetric information, indivisibility and transaction costs.
A ﬁrst obvious problem is the signiﬁcant data collection implied by the dimension of the
problem. Projects, active and inactive, are numerous in a ﬁrm and obtaining the corresponding
cash ﬂows over time is no small task. The information collected is also likely to lack precision.
Therefore, the frontier may be derived under imprecise and potentially incomplete information,
and uncertainty will prevail as to its exact position. This uncertainty will directly aﬀect determi-
nation of the optimal mix of production and risk management activities.
A parallel with mean-variance optimization in asset allocation will help us gauge the extent
of the problem. It is well known in this literature that small changes in the assumed distribution
of asset returns often imply large changes in the optimized portfolio. Many portfolios may be
statistically as eﬃcient as the ones on the eﬃcient frontier. Several statistical solutions have
been proposed to account for the variability of the eﬃcient frontier (see Michaud, 1998) and
to increase the stability of the optimal portfolio (Jagannathan and Ma, 2003). Beyond these
statistical solutions, one can mitigate the uncertainty associated with a detailed computation of
intertemporal cash ﬂows by aggregating projects among various organizational units. This will
make the problem of gathering data generally easier given the accounting system already in place
and facilitate the optimization process.
Asymmetric information could also prevent a ﬁrm from attaining the project mix that maxi-
mizes its value. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems can impede the process of gathering
information at every level of a ﬁrm’s hierarchy (see Williamson 1967). Managers may propose
projects that have been selected on criteria other than maximizing ﬁrm value. The collection of
projects from which the frontier is drawn may not, therefore, be the right one and the ﬁnal mix
of projects will be suboptimal. Solutions for these problems are the usual incentive schemes that
will help elicit the right information.
Another important diﬃculty in drawing up a possibility frontier for a ﬁrm lies in the indi-
visibility of real assets. In portfolio theory with inﬁnitely divisible ﬁnancial assets, it is always
possible to be arbitrarily close to the eﬃcient point on the frontier. With real activities, some
projects must be undertaken completely or not at all. A numerical search for the optimal mix
of activities has to proceed diﬀerently, but it is still possible to arrive at a frontier. It will not
have the smooth appearance that we drew in our graphs but it will keep its optimality property.
Similarly, some constraints may be imposed on the minimal size of projects in deriving the optimal
frontier.
20Transaction costs may explain why a ﬁrm does not want to continuously change the optimal
mix of projects. For example, premature termination of a project may involve penalties in terms
of labor compensation or legal fees. A change in the optimal mix may also be postponed because
of ﬁxed costs associated with the disposal of ﬁxed assets. Incorporating these transaction costs
in portfolio choice is an extremely diﬃcult theoretical and computational issue. Only partial
solutions with speciﬁc cost structures, often unrealistic, are available. Transaction costs associated
with a change of policy are just one example of sunk or irreversible costs. When a project in under
way, managers may induce some changes that will aﬀect its future cash ﬂows; this is another
potentially important source of costs.
5.3 An application to Va Rand CaR constraints
Another implication of our framework concerns regulatory or self-imposed cash ﬂows-at-risk (CaR)
or value-at-risk (VaR) constraints. We show in this section that a ﬁrm can, through appropriate
ﬁnancial risk management operations, meet these ﬁnancial constraints without changing its value
maximizing activities and therefore without any impact on its market value. This suggests that,
because of the VaR and CaR constraints they face, ﬁrms in regulated industries such as ﬁnancial
services and public utilities will be heavier users of derivatives and other ﬁnancial risk management
instruments.
Ac a s hﬂow-at-risk constraint imposes the requirement that the cash-ﬂow shortfall E(cf)−
cf will surpass a desired level (CaR)w i t hag i v e np r o b a b i l i t yα: Pr[E(cf) − cf > CaR]=α.
These constraints, when binding, are usually perceived as preventing the maximization of ﬁrm
value. Every (E,SCOR) combination can be associated with a CaR value. Iso-CaR curves, that
is curves on which all points have the same CaR value, can be drawn. On Figure 6, the CaR
value at point AH i st h es a m ea sa tp o i n tD. Let us identify this curve as CaRH and suppose
that a ﬁrm is required to satisfy that CaRH level.
[Insert Figure 6]
A ﬁrm’s value is not maximized at point AH s i n c et h ei s o - v a l u el i n et h r o u g hAH lies below the iso-
value line through AL, the value maximizing point. The project mix in AL is certainly attainable
given the possibility set of the ﬁrm, but CaRL, the iso-CaR curve through point AL, does not
satisfy the constraint. As a result, the diﬀerence in ﬁrm value between CL/RF and CH/RF
represents the cost of the CaR constraint.
With perfect capital markets, a ﬁrm is always able to trade zero-value ﬁnancial contracts at
no cost to move along the iso-value line whose slope is the market price of risk. Then, such a
movement with ﬁnancial instruments along the iso-value line going through AL can bring the ﬁrm
to point D,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes the CaR requirement. At point D, ﬁrm value is equal to CL/RF >
21CH/RF since point D lies on the same iso-value line as AL. Again, value is not created by ﬁnancial
risk management per se. It simply makes a ﬁrm obey a CaR constraint while keeping its optimal
mix of real activities. This would have been infeasible without the use of ﬁnancial instruments.
Therefore, CaR constraints should have no impact on the market value of ﬁrms under perfect
capital markets. Hence, a ﬁrm should instruct its real asset managers (POM and RRM) to
maximize its value and then ask the ﬁnancial risk manager to use ﬁnancial transactions to satisfy
the CaR requirement. Consequently, ﬁnancial risk managers in industries with binding CaR
regulation, such as the ﬁnancial services industry, will use more zero net present value ﬁnancial
contracts that reduce a ﬁrm’s risk and expected cash ﬂows (typically from AL to D in Figure 6)
in order to attain the risk-return constraint set by the regulatory body, at no cost in terms of ﬁrm
value.
5.4 Implications for Industrial Organization Analysis
Despite its arguably abstract nature, our ﬁnancial and real risk management model leads to several
empirical implications for industrial organization analysis. We discuss below some of our results
in the context of this literature.
Our empirical analysis shows that ﬁrms whose cash ﬂows are more reactive to changes in the
market price of risk are more likely to use ﬁnancial risk management instruments. An interpreta-
tion of this result is that the use of ﬁnancial derivatives facilitates the resolution of coordination
problems between line managers, a problem that is more likely to occur when changes in the
project mix are important. Our argument thus suggests that multi-industrial and multinational
ﬁrms, that have a more diverse project mix than single-industry single-country ﬁrms, as well as
ﬁrms with signiﬁcant growth options, will be heavier users of derivatives.25
Larger corporations are more likely faced with more challenging coordination problems simply
because of their wider dispersion of real assets and extensive distribution of responsibilities.26
Indeed, Nance et al. (1997), Mian (1996) and Graham and Rogers (2002) have shown that
ﬁnancial risk management procedures and products, such as forwards, futures, swaps, and options,
are more common in larger ﬁrms.27 These empirical regularities contradict theories in which the
25Indeed, Geczy et al. (1997) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with extensive foreign exchange-rate exposure (like multinational
ﬁrms) are more important users of derivatives; He and Ng (1998) maintain the same in the case of conglomerates;
and Nance et al. (1993) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with signiﬁcant growth options use more derivatives.
26With respect to size, for instance, Bodnar et al. (1998), Nance et al. (1993) and Geczy et al. (1997) show that
larger ﬁrms hedge more through the use of derivatives than smaller ﬁrms, even though their expected bankruptcy
costs are relatively lower. Whereas Block and Gallagher (1986) and Booth et al. (1984) argue that larger ﬁrms
engage in more ﬁnancial risk management because of the large ﬁxed costs involved to hedge ﬁnancial risks, we argue
i n s t e a dt h a tt h e yd os ob e c a u s e ,r e l a t i v et os m a l l e rﬁrms, they experience more diﬃcult coordination problems.
Firms present in more business segments, such as multinational ﬁrms and conglomerates that have a more diverse
project mix than single-industry single-country ﬁrms, will likely experience more important coordination problems,
hence should be greater users of derivatives.
27See also the results from the Wharton-Chase survey (1995) and the Wharton-CIBC Wood Gundy survey (1996)
22value of ﬁnancial risk management is based upon the reduction of the cost of ﬁnancial distress.
Stulz (1996) writes:
“The primary emphasis of the [corporate risk management] theory is on the role of
derivatives in reducing the variability of corporate cash ﬂows and, in so doing, reducing
various costs associated with ﬁnancial distress. The actual corporate use of deriva-
tives, however, does not seem to correspond closely to the theory. For one thing, large
companies make far greater use of derivatives than small ﬁrms, even though small
ﬁrms have more volatile cashﬂows, more restricted access to capital, and thus presum-
ably more reason to buy protection against ﬁnancial trouble. Perhaps more puzzling,
however, is that many companies appear to be using [ﬁnancial] risk management to
pursue goals other than variance reduction.”
Guay and Kothari (2003) considered the magnitude of risk exposure hedged by ﬁnancial
derivatives in 234 large non-ﬁnancial corporations using derivatives. Their results show that the
amounts involved are relatively modest relative to ﬁrm size and operating and investment cash
ﬂows. The authors state that “Although our results suggest most ﬁrms hold derivatives positions
that are small in magnitude relative to entity-level risks,” their results are potentially consistent
with, among other factors, “ﬁrms using derivatives for purposes other than those predicted by
traditional risk-management theory.” (p.426)
T h e s ee m p i r i c a lr e g u l a r i t i e sa r ec o m p a t i b l ew ith the predictions of our model. To justify the
greater use of ﬁnancial derivatives by large ﬁrms, previous studies have invoked the large costs
of setting up a risk management function. Besides this cost argument, we propose that ﬁnancial
risk management alleviates reorganization and coordination costs, which is a diﬀerent objective
from a variance reduction one. Another test would be to compare corporations where the number
of executives who have a say in project approval is large with corporations where that number
is small. Because ﬁnancial risk management is more valuable for corporations that have major
coordination problems, our model predicts that ﬁrms with a larger number of executives involved
in project selection will use more ﬁnancial risk management techniques. We are not aware of any
study on that topic.
Finally, our model leads to a renewed consideration of the use of ﬁnancial hedging instruments
by ﬁrms subject to regulated or self-imposed ﬁnancial constraints, such as value-at-risk or cash
ﬂow-at-risk constraints. We showed (Figure 4) that ﬁnancial risk management could, through
the use of zero-value contracts, allow ﬁrms to meet those constraints without sacriﬁcing ﬁrm
value. Our model suggests therefore that, because they are typically subject to stringent ﬁnancial
as mentioned in Stulz (1996, page 9): “Whereas 65% of companies with a market value greater than $250 million
reported using derivatives, only 13% of the ﬁrms with market values of $50 million or less claimed to use them.”
See also Boyer and McCormack (2009) for more recent evidence in the manufacturing sector.
23constraints of the VaR and CaR types, ﬁrms in sectors such as ﬁnancial services and utilities will
be among the heavier users of derivatives and other ﬁnancial risk management instruments. The
reason we elicit here for this signiﬁcant use of ﬁnancial risk management procedures and products
is clearly diﬀerent from the standard argument, namely the reduction of ﬁnancial distress cost.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The goal of this paper was to oﬀer a new theory to explain the use of ﬁnancial risk management
tools such as derivatives in non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Modern ﬁnancial economic theories on the topic
are decades old so that no new theory has been empirically validated since the mid eighties. The
new theory we develop is based on the principle that coordination problems between diﬀerent ﬁrm
functions (real operations) are alleviated through ﬁnancial operations. Empirically, our theory
implies that the more reactive a ﬁrm is to changes in the market price of risk, the more prevalent
will be the use of ﬁnancial derivatives.
Using time series from 1993 to 2004, we measured this reactivity factor for 269 large U.S. ﬁrms.
We then related reactivity to the use of ﬁnancial derivative instruments. First, we found that
there is a strong relationship at the industry level between the aggregate measure of reactivity
and the use of derivatives. Second, we constructed a probability model at the ﬁrm level to explain
the number of operational risks managed though ﬁnancial derivatives. We found a strong and
signiﬁcant role for the reactivity factor in this relation, even after controlling for ﬁrm size, leverage,
foreign exposure, and the convexity of the tax schedule. We then concluded that the reactivity
factor, a measure of the concavity of the possibility frontier, is an important determinant of a
ﬁrm’s use of ﬁnancial risk management instruments.
The framework we present shows that both real and ﬁnancial risk management can add value
to a ﬁrm. Contrary to the current academic view of ﬁnancial risk management, which makes it
a special purpose function of a corporation rather than an integral part of decision making, we
proposed a characterization of ﬁrms as nexus of projects deﬁned by their expected cash ﬂows
and risk, where both ﬁnancial and real risk management activities appear alongside operations in
maximizing ﬁrm value.
We were then able to deﬁne a transformation possibility set for a ﬁrm. In this context, the
object of production and operations management is to raise expected cash ﬂows while real risk
management aims to lower risk. By choosing the projects to invest in, managers search for
eﬃciency (i.e., attaining the frontier of possibilities) as well as for optimality (i.e., reaching the
point on that frontier that maximizes ﬁrm value given the market prices of risk factors). Conﬂicts
arise when managers, obeying or reacting to diﬀerent incentive contracts or objectives, do not
view the projects as having the same potential contribution to ﬁrm value. This is where ﬁnancial
24risk management can help a ﬁrm in maximizing value.
The facilitating role of ﬁnancial risk management is crucial whenever changes in the market
price of risk induces important changes in the optimal set of projects and activities. Our empirical
strategy rests precisely on identifying how much a ﬁrm reacts to changes in the market price of risk:
a ﬁrm’s reactivity depends on the relative concavity of its possibility frontier. Our interpretation
of this relationship is that more reactive ﬁrms are likely to face important coordination problems in
maximizing their value and that ﬁnancial risk management facilitates coordination. It is through
such facilitation that ﬁnancial risk management indirectly contributes to ﬁrm value, especially in
a context where real asset management activities are decentralized.
Access to micro data sets on ﬁrms could lead to the estimation of risk-reward frontiers, that is,
frontiers expressed in terms of risk and expected cash ﬂows. This could lead to a reﬁned analysis
of the links between characteristics of the eﬃcient frontier, market parameters and organizational
characteristics of the ﬁrm. This opens a fascinating new avenue to study the relationship between
ﬁrm value and risk management.
257 Appendix - Data Set Description
7.1 Accounting and Market Data
Accounting data included in the database have been extracted from Compustat. Information
about betas, risk premium and risk free rate have been extracted from CRSP. Below we describe
how each variable was computed from the original items available in Compustat. The numbers
refer to the item number in Compustat. A full list of the available items in Compustat is contained
in a more complete Appendix available upon request from the authors.
• MV Value: Firm’s market value calculated as the number of shares out- standing times the
stock price at ﬁscal year-end: Data25 × Data199.
• Book Value: Firm’s book value calculated as total assets minus intangibles and total liabil-
ities, (Data6 - Data33 - Data181).
• Div Yield: Dividend paid by share by the stock’s price: Data26 / Data199.
• BV/MV: Firm Market Value
Firm Book Value calculated as Data25×Data199
(Data6 - Data33 -Data181).
• LT Debt/MV: Firm’s long term debt by its market value, Data9
Data25 - Data199
• R&D Expenses: Data46
• Assets: Total assets, Data6
• Liabilities: Total liabilities, Data181
• R&D/Assets: R&D expenses by total assets, Data46
Data6
• Employees: Data29
• Foreign currency Adj: Foreign currency adjustment, Data150
• Cash: Cash and short-term investment, Data1
• Inventories: Data3
• Current Assets: Data4
• Current Liabilities: Data5
• Quick Ratio: Current Assets - Inventories
Current Liabilities = Data4 - Data3
Data5
• Deferred taxes: Data269+ Data270 + Data271
26• Investment tax credit: Data208
• NOL carryforward: Net Operating Losses Carryforward, Data52
• RP: Risk Premium variation calculated as Xt − Xt−1
• SCOR: Calculated as Firm Market Value ×β × σm
• E(CF): Firm Cash Flows or Operating earnings before depreciation, Data13
• Shares Outstanding: Number of common shares outstanding at ﬁscal year- end, Data25
• Stock Price: Price of the common stock at ﬁscal year-end, Data199
• Capital Ex.: Capital expenditures, Data145
7.2 Hedges and Derivative Instruments
Disclosures about hedges and derivatives instruments are included in Item 7a - Quantitative
and Qualitative Disclosure about Market Risk a n di nd i ﬀerent notes from Notes to consolidated
Financial statements included in Item 8 Financial Statements and Supplementary Data from the
annual report on Form 10-K.
Under Item 7a we found information related to the type of particular market risk and exposures
faced by the ﬁrm. In addition, we may have found some information about instruments used for
hedging. However, fair market value and notional amounts of contracts entered into are usually
not disclosed in that section. Still we have looked to this section in order to have a general idea
about the hedging policy of the company and the type of risk hedged. If no derivative instruments
were contracted during the period covered by the study, it is in this section that we have collected
the information.
The greatest part of the data on hedging was collected from the Notes to consolidated Financial
statements. Firms reported their derivatives activities for hedging purposes on their annual report
through a note on ﬁnancial instruments or either on a separate note dedicate speciﬁcally to hedging
instruments and policies. In this type of note on ﬁnancial instruments we found a description
of the type of instrument used and for what purpose (hedging or trading) it was entered into.
Subsequently, ﬁrms report the carrying value, the fair value and sometimes the notional value of
their instruments in accordance with the FASB’s disclosure requirements.
We have looked at derivatives instruments used for four diﬀerent types of risks:
• Foreign exposure
• Debt and interest rate related
27• Commodities
• Equity
We reported the management of such risk with derivatives by a binary variable (1 if the
exposure is hedged with derivatives). We also report in the database the aggregate notional (when
disclosed), the total fair value of derivatives and ﬁnally the fair value of instruments grouped by
t h et y p eo fr i s kh e d g e d .
While regulation by the FASB about derivatives requires that companies disclosed the type
of instruments they use and the fair value of those same instruments, it appears that companies
report such use of derivatives in ways that are quite unequal and diﬀerent. When we could not
gather the data at the level of detail we required we did not include the ﬁrm in our sample. More
details on the method of data collection can be found in examples in a supplementary appendix
available upon request from the authors.
7.3 Managerial Ownership
For managerial ownership we collected both stock ownership and options ownership. In order
to have information on a comparable basis between ﬁrms, we reported the ownership of the top
ﬁve named executive oﬃcers of each ﬁrm. Data on beneﬁcial ownership of managers were usually
found in the Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the proxy statement) on form DEF 14A.
In this proxy statement, under the section Executive Compensation, companies disclosed the
value of unexercised (exercisable and unexercisable) options at ﬁscal year-end for the CEO and
for their ﬁve most compensated executive oﬃcers. We used this information to calculate the
managerial options ownership data. Information regarding stock ownership of management was
obtained through the section Information about Beneﬁcial Ownership of Principal Stockholders
and Management which is also found on the proxy statement. In this section, ﬁrms report the
amount and the type of ownership of multiple stockholders. We added the number of stocks that
the top ﬁve named executive managers hold and multiplied it by the price of the stock at ﬁscal
year-end, which was found either under data item 199 from Compustat or in the proxy statement.
7.4 Business Segments
Data about business segments were collected on the basis of the reportable segments of ﬁrms
which are subject to regulation from the FASB. SFAS No. 131 Disclosures about Segments of an
Enterprise and Related Information requires that a company with publicly traded debt or equity
securities report annual and interim ﬁnancial and descriptive information about its reportable
operating segments. Operating segments are components of an enterprise for which separate
28ﬁnancial information is available and such information is evaluated regularly by the chief operating
decision maker when deciding how to allocate resources and assess performance.
Segments are generally organized either on the basis of business lines and type of products
sold or on a geographic basis in function of the customer’s country or region. Although most ﬁrms
reported the same number of business segments through the years covered, it is possible that some
ﬁrms had proceeded to a revision of their reporting segments due for example to acquisitions or
discontinuances of operations. Data concerning reportable segments are disclosed in Item 1 of
the annual report or in a note on business segments from the Notes to Consolidated Financial
Statements under Item 8 of annual report on form 10-K.
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33Table 1. Distribution of ﬁrms across industries
Industry SIC Code Number of ﬁrms
Food 2000-2099 1 13
Mining 1000-1499 2 11
Construction 1500-1999 3 4
Manufacturing 2200-3999 4 136
Transportation 4000-4799 5 5
Communications 4800-4899 6 4
Utilities 4900-4999 7 12
Wholesale 5000-5199 8 4
Retail 5200-5999 9 25
Finance 6000-6599 10 31
Service 7000-9999 13 22
Non-Classiﬁed 14 2
34Table 2. Estimated reactivity and use of ﬁnancial derivative instruments by industry
This table reports the weighted average number of risks a ﬁrm hedges through the use of ﬁnancial
derivatives by industry as reported in the ﬁrms’ 10-K forms. Operational risks include commodity, equity
and foreign exchange risks. Interest rate risk is the fourth possible risk that a ﬁrm can report being hedge.
Industries are classiﬁed in decreasing order of their average estimated reactivity level. Reactivity is calcu-
lated as theγi coeﬃcient in the regression ∆Pit = αi +γi∆θt +εit,w h e r e∆θt is the annual variation in
the market price of risk and ∆Pit is calculated as
p
(SCORit − SCORi,t−1)2 +( CFit − CFi,t−1)2/Vit.
The rank reports the industry’s decreasing relative position in terms of the number of risks hedged (1 is













Utilities 0.761 1.206 5 2.111 4
Food 0.679 1.758 2 2.622 2
Conglomerates 0.646 2.000 1 3.000 1
Mining 0.603 1.208 4 2.043 6
Financial 0.574 1.130 6 2.068 5
Service 0.551 1.673 3 2.462 3
Retail 0.508 0.619 9 1.293 10
Wholesale 0.470 0.163 12 1.030 11
Manufacturing 0.451 1.028 7 1.609 8
Communications 0.328 0.521 10 1.521 9
Transportation 0.075 0.824 8 1.824 7
Construction -0.017 0.401 11 1.000 12
35Table 3. Firm reactivity and number of operational risks hedged
This table presents the multivariate ordered probit regressions that explain the number of
operational risk a ﬁrm hedges. Reactivity is calculated as the γi coeﬃcient in the regression
∆Pit = αi + γi∆θt + εit,w h e r e∆θt is the annual variation in the market price of risk
and ∆Pit is calculated as
p
(SCORit − SCORi,t−1)2 +( CFit − CFi,t−1)2/Vit.B u s i n e s s
segments is the number of segments a ﬁrm operates in as reported in Compustat. Log(Assets)
is the natural logarithm of total assets of the ﬁrm. Dividend Yield is the dividend paid for
the year by the ﬁrm divided by its stock price. MarketValue/BookValue is calculated as the
market value of the ﬁrm’s equity (stock price times the number of issued shares) divided by
its book value. Long-term Debt/MarketValue is calculated as the value of the long-term debt
divided by the market value of the ﬁrm (market value of equity plus book value of debt).
R&D/Assets is calculated as research and development expenses divided by the total assets
of the ﬁrm. Quick Ratio is the value of the currents assets minus the inventories divided by
current liabilities. Foreign Sales Share is the percentage of the foreign sales over the total sales
of the ﬁrm. NOL carryforward / Assets is calculated as the net operating losses carryforward
divided by the ﬁrm’s total assets. Log(Managerial Stock) is the natural logarithm of the
stocks market value holdings of the top ﬁve managers. Log(Managerial Option) is the natural
logarithm of the options market value holdings of the top ﬁve managers.
Without Industry Controls With Industry Controls
Predicted Sign Coeﬃcient Pvalue Coeﬃcient Pvalue
Reactivity + 25.1009 0.005 18.6416 0.025
Business Segments + 0.0890 0.040 – –
Log(Assets) + 0.2986 0.002 0.3345 0.001
Dividend Yield + -0.0033 0.168 -0.0054 0.021
Market Value / Book Value + -0.0007 0.591 -0.0017 0.150
LT Debt/Market Value + -0.0084 0.412 -0.0045 0.625
R&D/Assets + 0.0464 0.983 -0.6505 0.781
Quick Ratio - -0.0902 0.203 -0.1297 0.076
Foreign Sales Share + 1.3793 0.000 1.2390 0.000
NOL carryforward/Assets + 2.0544 0.043 2.0320 0.048
Log (ManagerialShare) + -0.0527 0.319 -0.0161 0.787
Log (ManagerialOption) - -0.0447 0.464 -0.0211 0.743
Pseudo R-square 0.1225 0.1638
36Figure 1: Production and operation management (POM), real risk management
(RRM) and nancial risk management (FRM) in the rm.
37Figure 2: Ecient frontier given the portfolio of projects available to the rm.
38Figure 3: Ecient frontier and value maximization of the rm given the price of risk.
39Figure 4: Coordination problems.
40Figure 5: Value of nancial risk management.
41Figure 6: The value of using nancial instruments for a rm constrained by CaR
requirements.
42Figure 7: Impact of a change in the market price of risk on low and high concavity
frontiers.
43Figure 8: Number of Operational Risks Hedged as a Function of Reactivity by Indus-
try.
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